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Hegel’s Idea of the State 
Stephen Houlgate 
 
1. Freedom, Right and Community 
 
Hegel’s philosophy of “subjective spirit” in his Encyclopaedia (1830) shows that the human 
spirit, when fully developed, takes the form of “free will, which is for itself as free will” (Enc. 
3 §481). In his account of “objective spirit” Hegel then shows that the free will — insofar as 
it is rational, rather than merely arbitrary — conceives of freedom as something both 
individual and universal. Freedom, for Hegel, belongs to the self-conscious individual; yet at 
the same time, as the object of a rational will, “freedom and its content  ...  are the universal 
in itself” (Enc. 3 §485). This means not only that freedom belongs in principle to all self-
conscious individuals, but also that it has a rational character of its own that individuals must 
recognise if they are to be truly free.    
 The truly free will, however, does not just know itself to be free, but aims “to realize 
its concept, freedom, in the externally objective realm”, thereby turning its freedom into “a 
world determined by the will” (Enc. 3 §484). When freedom becomes something objective, 
something actually existing, in this way, it comes to be, and to be conceived as, right. Right, 
for Hegel, is thus not just an abstract idea, but the “existence [Dasein] of the free will” that 
the latter acquires through its own agency (Enc. 3 §486, translation amended). The world of 
freedom produced by the will is in turn for it a world of right.   
Yet this world, though produced by the free will, exhibits what Hegel calls “the form 
of necessity” and thereby becomes a “power” (Macht) confronting the will (Enc. 3 §484). It 
does so partly because it is objective — in the form of institutions and laws — and so resists 
the merely subjective whims of individuals; but also because it is generated by the “concept” 
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of freedom, a concept that the will does not itself determine but to which it must, and does, 
conform if it is truly free. In Hegel’s view, the free will is self-determining and so makes 
decisions and initiates actions. Yet, at the same time, if it is truly free, it is bound by the 
concept or “logic” of freedom and so builds a world determined by that logic, a world that 
includes civil society and the state. Since the latter are produced by the logical necessity 
within freedom itself, they constitute a power that the free will must recognize and respect.  
 Right, therefore, is freedom, understood not only as something actual, but also as 
something necessary: as that which the truly free will must affirm (see Houlgate 2016, 106). 
In other words, right is the will’s own freedom, understood as binding it. This necessity 
belongs essentially to the concept of right. A right does not have the force of a natural law, 
and so cannot by itself make the will do what the will does not want to do. Nonetheless, it 
demands recognition from the will and thereby confronts the latter with normative, if not 
natural, necessity. Hegel implicitly highlights this moment of necessity in right by noting, in 
the Encyclopaedia, that rights bring duties with them (Enc. 3 §486) and, in his Philosophy of 
Right (1820), that “right is something utterly sacred” (RPh §30). In his 1821/22 lectures, 
however, he makes this necessity explicit: “Right is necessary” (VPR2, 615).1  
 Earlier in the Encyclopaedia Hegel argues that self-consciousness is free only insofar 
as “it knows itself to be recognized in the free other, and knows this in so far as it recognizes 
the other and knows it to be free” (Enc. 3 §436, translation amended). True freedom, 
therefore, is not something that the individual can enjoy solely by him- or herself, but is to be 
found only in relations of mutual recognition — in forms of community — with others. In the 
section on objective spirit (and the Philosophy of Right), Hegel shows that the specific forms 
of community made necessary by the concept of freedom include the family, the estates of 
civil society and the corporations. Since each of these is an objective institution that forms a 
                                                          
1 All translations from VPR are my own.  
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necessary part of the world of freedom, each constitutes a distinct sphere of right. Right, in 
Hegel’s view, thus belongs not only to individuals, but also to the communities in which 
alone individuals are truly free. The highest community of mutual recognition made 
necessary by freedom, and that contains and sustains all the others, is the state — that is, the 
free, rational state to which modern states more or less approximate (see Houlgate 2008, 
xxix). 
 
2. Right and the State 
 
The family, for Hegel, is held together by the “feeling of love”; civil society, by contrast, is 
the interconnection of individuals in pursuit of their own particular interests (Enc. 3 §§518, 
523, 535). The rational state differs from both of these forms of “ethical life” by having as its 
aim “the form of conscious universality” (Enc. 3 §535). The citizens of the state, qua citizens, 
are thus united not by love or narrow self-interest, but by a common consciousness that 
freedom is something universal (in the two senses mentioned above). Moreover, they 
understand the state to be the guarantee of universal freedom, indeed to be itself the 
embodiment of right. Thus, the citizens of the state, qua citizens, are animated by a rational 
will that wills the universal, rather than what is merely particular, and that recognises the 
state to be the objective world of universal freedom.  
 As Hegel shows, freedom and right must take several different forms, including the 
right to property, the right to achieve satisfaction through action and work, and the right to 
family life. The state, however, is the ultimate guarantee of freedom and as such must stand 
in a twofold relation to these other forms of right. On the one hand, it must protect and realise 
these rights. Rights claimed by individuals mean little if they are not recognised by an 
authority and cannot be realised, that is, if the opportunity to own things or to find 
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satisfaction through work is not guaranteed. Accordingly, Hegel writes, the task of the state 
consists in maintaining people as “persons”, as bearers of right, “thus making right a 
necessary actuality”. The state also “promotes their well-being” and “protects the family and 
guides civil society” (through, for example, consumer protection measures and setting the 
prices of the common necessities of life) (Enc. 3 §537; see also RPh §236). The state, as 
Hegel conceives it, is thus not a totalitarian institution that claims all rights for itself, but it 
ensures that the rights of persons and communities within it are realised and do not remain 
empty words.  
 On the other hand, the state, as the ultimate condition of all rights, is itself the highest 
community of freedom. As such, it has the right to prevent the subordinate spheres within it 
from asserting themselves at the expense of one another, and thereby to preserve them as 
moments of the whole (Enc. 3 §537). This is not to deny that individuals and communities 
can assert their rights against the state when official bodies and civil servants abuse their 
power (RPh §§261, 295).2 Yet this right to appeal against the state must itself be guaranteed 
by the state and its institutions, that is, by the sovereign power within which all rights are 
realised (RPh §278).  
 
3. The State and its Constitution 
  
In the state, as we have noted, freedom is understood to be something universal. Moreover, 
the particular rights enjoyed in the state by individuals, communities and institutions, and the 
provisions made by the state to realise those rights, are themselves set out in the form of 
particular universals, namely laws. “Laws,” as Hegel puts it, thus “express the determinations 
of the content of objective freedom” (Enc. 3 §538). Such laws restrict the “independent 
                                                          
2 For the contrary view, see Schnädelbach, 1997, 260, and Siep 2017, 212. 
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wilfulness” of individuals, since they require the latter to recognise the rights they articulate. 
Yet in a free, rational state they are also the “absolute final end” of human action: individuals 
pursue their own particular interests, but their activity is informed by recognition of and 
respect for the laws that secure their rights. Such recognition and respect may be self-
conscious and deliberate, but it can also be a matter of “disposition” (Gesinnung) and 
“custom” (Sitte) (Enc. 3 §538; see also RPh §§151, 268). Indeed, Hegel claims in his 1822/23 
lectures that the habit of respecting the laws and institutions of the state, and of living an 
ordered, law-abiding life, is in fact what holds the free state together. People often imagine, 
he says, that the state is held together by “force” (Gewalt), “but the bond is the fundamental 
feeling of order that everyone possesses” (VPR2, 1002; see RPh §268Z). The state, as Hegel 
conceives it, is thus not just a political entity, but exists in the dispositions, habits and actions 
of its citizens. 
 These dispositions are initially formed by the institutions of civil society, namely the 
estates and corporations into which the latter is divided (as well as by the family). Such 
institutions, though distinct from the political state, thus belong to the overall constitution 
(Verfassung) of the state. Yet the political state or “government” (Regierung) also has its own 
constitution (Enc. 3 §541). As Hegel notes, every state has a constitution of some kind that 
reflects the spirit of the people concerned (Enc. 3 §540 & R). In the free, rational state, 
however, the political constitution is determined by self-determining reason, or the “concept” 
(Begriff), as it is conceived in the “subjective logic” (1816) in Hegel’s Science of Logic (Enc. 
3 §541; see also RPh §269, and WL GW 12:32-52). The political constitution, as Hegel 
conceives it, contains some features that critics (such as Marx) regard as irrational, indeed 
“medieval” (see Marx 1970, 113-14, and Houlgate 1997, 62-9). In Hegel’s view, however, 
each aspect of that constitution is made necessary by reason or the “concept” and so belongs 
to a free and rational modern state: “the constitution is existent justice, as the actuality of 
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freedom in the development of all its rational determinations” (Enc. 3 §539). To understand 
why the political constitution of the state must take the form described in the Encyclopaedia 
and Philosophy of Right, we must therefore briefly examine the logical structure of the 
“concept” itself.3 
 For Kant, concepts are representations under which other representations can be 
subsumed, and so they are “predicates of possible judgments” (CPR B94). The representation 
“rose”, for example, can be subsumed under the concept “red” in the judgement “the rose is 
red”. For Hegel, however, this is just how the understanding (Verstand) conceives of 
concepts (see Enc. 3 §541R). Reason (Vernunft), by contrast, conceives of the concept, not 
principally as subsuming given particulars under it, but rather as particularising and 
individuating itself.4 The concept as such is a universal — whether empirical, such as “lion”, 
or a priori, such as “quantity” — but it gives itself the form of a particular universal or 
“species” and of specific individuals — e.g. specific lions or numbers. The concept is thus the 
self-determining and self-differentiating universal. Note that in determining itself in this way, 
the concept establishes genuine differences between its moments: the universal turns itself 
into the particular and the individual that are logically different from it and one another. At 
the same time, the universal continues to be the universal in its particularity and individuality, 
since it particularises and individuates itself (WL, GW 12:34). The concept thus holds its 
                                                          
3 The “syllogism” is also important to Hegel’s idea of the state (see, e.g., Siep 1992, 263-4, 
and Wolff 2004, 297-8). As Sebastian Stein points out, however, the standard Hegel employs 
to determine the elements of the state is “not the syllogism but the concept” (Stein 2016, 
149). 
4 See, e.g., WL, GW 12:36: “The true, infinite universal [ ... ] determines itself freely 
[bestimmt sich frey]”. 
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distinct moments in a unity that Hegel compares to “free love” because it “relates to that 
which is distinct from it only as to itself” (WL, GW 12:35, translation amended).  
The logical structure of the concept requires more detailed examination than I can 
give it here (see Winfield 2012, 207-30). Yet we have seen enough to recognise that the 
political constitution of the state, insofar as it is rational and determined by the concept, must 
hold together in one self-relating unity the distinct moments of universality, particularity and 
individuality. In other words, the key to a free, rational state lies in the “division of powers” 
within that state (Enc. 3 §542R). Each power must be accorded its distinctive role that is not 
to be usurped by the others. On the other hand, they must also be bound together as moments 
of one whole. As we shall see, what unites them into a single constitution is the participation 
of each in the others in such a way that each preserves its distinct function (see RPh §272).5 
The familiar modern conception of the division of powers is set out in Montesquieu’s 
The Spirit of the Laws (1748). In Montesquieu’s view, there is no “liberty” if “legislative 
power is united with executive power”, or if “the power of judging is not separate from 
legislative power and from executive power” (Montesquieu 1989, 157 [part 2, ch. 6]). 
According to Hegel, however, the concept makes necessary a different division of powers: 
not between the legislature, executive and judiciary, but between the legislative, executive 
and “princely” (fürstlich) powers (Enc. 3, §§541-4). This — in Hegel’s view — more rational 
division is based on the distinction between the logical moments of universal, particular and 
individual in the “concept”. As Hegel puts it in the Philosophy of Right, the legislative power 
is “the power to determine and establish the universal” in the form of law; the executive or 
“governmental power” is responsible for the “subsumption of particular spheres and 
individual cases under the universal”, that is, under the law; and the princely power brings the 
                                                          
5 See Siep 1992, 265. This reflects the fact that each moment of the concept is equally the 
whole concept and so contains all three moments; see WL, GW 12:32. 
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different powers together “in an individual unity which is thus the apex and beginning of the 
whole” (RPh §273).6 The princely power is the “beginning” of the whole state — in a logical, 
if not historical, sense — since it embodies the unity of the state within which the different 
powers are contained, as well as the state’s sovereign power of self-determination and 
decision (see Enc. 3 §542, and RPh §§275, 279). Accordingly, Hegel starts his account of the 
powers of the state in both the Encyclopaedia and the Philosophy of Right with the princely 
power.7    
 
4. The Princely Power (or Power of the Sovereign) 
 
The “concept” qua universal, as described in the Logic, exhibits a certain unity in the fact that 
it continues in its different moments and so relates to itself in them. Yet it comes to be 
explicitly self-relating, explicitly for itself, only as individuality (WL, GW 12:34, 49). 
Individuality thus has an ambiguous status. On the one hand, it is the concept itself that has 
come to be for itself; on the other hand, it is only one moment within the concept. Moreover, 
it is both at the same time: the distinct moment within the concept in which the latter itself 
comes to be explicitly self-relating.   
 This same ambiguity is evident in the princely power in the rational state. On the one 
hand, that power turns the whole state into an explicitly self-relating, self-determining unity, 
into a subject; on the other hand, it is but one among three different powers in the state. 
Furthermore, it unifies the state precisely by embodying in a distinct form the state’s unity 
and sovereignty. The princely power is thus the “highest pinnacle of the state and its all-
                                                          
6 Emphasis added to “universal” and “individual”.  
7 Starting with the princely power is thus by no means logically unjustified, as Vittorio Hösle 
contends (Hösle 1998, 567).  
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pervasive unity” (Enc. 3 §542). There is, however, a subtle difference between the state and a 
universal such as “life.” Life takes the form of many individual living things. By contrast, the 
state is a community that is conscious of itself as a single unity; accordingly, it must be 
embodied in a single individual rather than many. Indeed, in this way the state realises the 
concept of individuality more fully than life does. The terms “many” or “some” in fact 
express logical particularity, rather than individuality, as in the particular judgement “some 
As are B”. By contrast, individuality or singularity (Einzelheit) is expressed by “this one” or 
just “this”, as in the singular judgement “this A is B” (WL, GW 12:72-3).        
 Reason, or the “concept,” thus requires the free, rational state to have one individual 
head of state or “monarch.” As Hegel writes in the Encyclopaedia, “in the perfect form of the 
state, in which all moments of the concept have reached their free existence, this subjectivity 
is not a so-called moral person” — a company or corporation — but “the will of one 
resolving individual — monarchy” (Enc. 3 §542; see also RPh §279R). Hegel’s wording here 
is significant: in the state in which the moments of the concept have “reached their free 
existence” — have been fully distinguished from one another — the unity and subjectivity of 
the state must be embodied in one individual. The legislative power, which passes laws 
dealing with matters of universal interest, involves the “participation of everyone [aller] who 
belongs to civil society” (Enc. 3 §544).8 The executive power, on the other hand, applies the 
law — the universal — to particular spheres of civil society and the state, and so is itself 
made up of different “particular authorities”. Accordingly, it requires the participation not of 
all in society, but only of some or “several” (mehrere) individuals (Enc. 3 §543). Sovereign 
princely power, by contrast, through which the state acts as one self-determining unity or 
subject is embodied in one individual: the head of state.9 Monarchy — the idea that there 
                                                          
8 In RPh §301 & R Hegel prefers the term “the many” (die Vielen), to “all”.  
9 See RPh §273R: “the monarch is one”. 
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should be one person at the pinnacle of the state, as opposed to an oligarchy or directory — is 
thus not just a hangover from feudal times. It belongs by logical necessity to a fully 
developed rational constitution in which universality, particularity and individuality are 
distinct. “The monarchical constitution” — or constitutional monarchy — “is therefore the 
constitution of developed reason” (Enc. 3 §542).  
  Those hostile to the idea of monarchy may take momentary comfort from the fact 
that the monarch, as so far conceived, may be an elected head of state, such as a modern 
president. All Hegel has demonstrated so far is that the head of a rational, constitutional state 
must be a single individual. Yet Hegel also argues, famously, that the latter must be a 
hereditary monarch (Enc. 3 §542R). Hereditary monarchy, however, is no more a remnant of 
feudalism in the modern state than is monarchy as such. It, too, is made necessary by the 
political constitution that is fully free and rational. More precisely it is made necessary by the 
severely reduced role of the monarch in a free, rational constitution (see Houlgate 1997, 55-
61). 
First, recall the distinction between the three powers in the political state. The 
legislative power determines the laws of the land and the executive applies those laws to 
particular spheres of civil society. The princely power, by contrast, does not make the laws 
(VPR2, 1016); nor, contrary to what Hegel calls the “false French view”, does it wield 
executive power and govern (see VPR3, 1441). It merely provides “the moment of abstract 
decision” through which laws come into effect and actions of the executive are approved; that 
is, it grants the “sanction under which anything whatsoever is done in the government” (Enc. 
3 §542R). The role of the monarch in Hegel’s state is thus similar to that of the British 
monarch or the German president, and unlike that of the US president, who heads the 
executive (see Wood 2011, 307). 
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Yet, as Hegel makes clear in the Philosophy of Right, the monarch is not the whole of 
the princely power, but only one moment of it (RPh §275). This is because the content of this 
power’s decisions is contained in the laws passed in the legislature and in the advice given to 
the monarch by ministers from the executive. All that is left to the monarch as such, 
therefore, is the “formal decision” itself. In Hegel’s well-known words, the monarch is 
merely the person “who says ‘yes’” and “puts the dot on the i”, the one who adds “I will” to 
the laws and policies presented by the other two powers (VPR2, 1015-16; see also RPh 
§280Z).10 Note that the decision made by the princely power as a whole is based on, or 
mediated by, the “objective” content of the laws and counsel presented to the monarch. The 
monarch’s formal decision, however, is groundless and unmediated — the abstractly free 
decision that expresses the unconditioned sovereignty of the state (RPh §§279-81).11 Since 
the role of the monarch is to do no more than make this unmediated sovereign decision, not to 
determine the content of the decision, he or she needs no special qualities beyond a “simply 
educated understanding” (VPR1, 177). The monarch’s “existence”, as Hegel puts it, thus can 
and should be as immediate and groundless as the decisions that he or she will make (RPh 
§281). Monarchs have therefore to be chosen by the immediacy of nature and to be 
hereditary: “the moment of abstract decision  ...  has within it the determination of 
                                                          
10 Thom Brooks argues that the monarch is more powerful than I suggest here (Brooks 2007, 
106-13). Note, however, that war and peace are matters for the “princely power,” not just the 
monarch (Enc. 3 §544, and RPh §329).  
11 Note that this sovereign decision is required in all cases, not just, as Tunick claims, “where 
we have no objective grounds for decision” (Tunick 1991, 492). 
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immediacy, and thus of nature, and with this the determination of individuals for the dignity 
of the princely power is established by heredity” (Enc. 3 §542R).12   
Note that, for Hegel, monarchy is required to be hereditary by the fully developed 
division of powers within a free, rational state. That division first requires there to be a 
“princely power” distinct from the legislative and executive powers and embodied in the 
monarch; and it then reduces the specific role of the monarch within the princely power to 
that of making immediate, groundless decisions (the content of which is provided by the 
other two powers). The logical connection of immediacy and nature — which is established 
at the end of the Logic and presupposed throughout the philosophy of right13 — then requires 
the monarch’s very “existence” to be determined immediately by nature and monarchy to be 
hereditary. The institution of hereditary monarchy — found today in several European states 
— is thus built into the very idea of a modern, free and rational, constitutional state. 
Conversely, hereditary monarchy itself guarantees that the other two powers in the 
state attain their rights: for the limited role of a hereditary monarch leaves the legislature free 
to pass laws and the executive free to govern (see RPh §286, and VPR1, 549). Hereditary 
constitutional monarchy, properly conceived, thus cannot be despotic but underpins true 
political freedom.  
 In the Encyclopaedia Hegel maintains that only the “speculative concept” can explain 
why hereditary monarchy belongs to a modern rational constitution (Enc. 3 §542R). The 
understanding, by contrast, often objects to this institution for two reasons. First, as Hegel 
                                                          
12 Hösle fails to see that, although the princely power is “mediated by universality” (in the 
form of laws), the monarch’s formal decision is purely immediate and groundless. He thus 
maintains, mistakenly, that the head of Hegel’s state should be a democratically elected (or 
“mediated”) president or chancellor (Hösle 1998, 567). 
13 See WL, GW 12:253, and RPh §280R; see also RPh §11: “the immediate or natural will”. 
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notes in 1819/20, understanding sees nature as something “negative” that should play no 
determining role in a world of freedom and certainly not in selecting the head of state (VPR1, 
545). It is thus incapable of seeing that a moment of groundless immediacy, determined by 
nature, belongs necessarily to the constitution of a rational state (see, e.g., Marx 1970, 34). 
 Understanding’s second objection to hereditary monarchy is that the people, rather 
than the head of state, are sovereign and so should choose their head of state themselves — 
that the free, rational state should be an “electoral realm” (Wahlreich) (RPh §281R, 
translation amended). In Hegel’s view, however, such a constitutional arrangement places the 
final decisions of the state “at the discretion of the particular will”, the will that seeks 
satisfaction in civil society. Moreover, since particular wills differ in their interests, an 
“electoral realm” exposes the position of head of state to the struggle between competing 
factions and so may prevent the elected monarch from embodying for the citizens the unity 
and sovereignty of the state as a whole. Hegel cites as examples political entities, such as the 
Holy Roman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in which, he claims, royal 
elections actually led to the “weakening and loss of the sovereignty of the state” and its 
eventual dissolution (VPR3, 1436, and RPh §281R).14 Yet we know that even in more stable 
electoral realms, such as the USA and France, presidential elections can prove divisive and 
set large swathes of the electorate at odds with their head of state. A hereditary monarch, by 
contrast, chosen by nature, and — as the sovereign — without particular interests of his or 
her own, is removed from the struggle between factions (RPh §281).  
 Hegel also has a more profound objection to the idea that the people should elect their 
head of state. As noted above, this idea is justified by the claim that the people, rather than 
the state or head of state, are sovereign; in Hegel’s view, however, such a claim rests on 
                                                          
14 In these entities, of course, only princes or nobles could vote for the head of state, not the 
general populace (VPR2, 1016). 
14 
 
misunderstanding the nature of political sovereignty. As he argues in the Philosophy of Right, 
one can indeed say that sovereignty resides with the “people” (Volk), but only if one 
understands by the latter the people organised into a rational constitutional state that is itself 
sovereign (RPh §279R). Such a state is in turn headed by a hereditary monarch. The idea that 
the people are sovereign, as opposed to the monarch, and that the people should thus elect the 
latter, is therefore confused: for the sovereignty of the people-as-a-state is embodied precisely 
in the hereditary monarch (see Tunick 1991, 483). To argue in this way is not mere sophistry 
on Hegel’s part. The idea that the people are sovereign is the idea that the free will of the 
people is sovereign. For Hegel, however, true freedom is not simply “arbitrariness” 
(Willkür), or the capacity to choose and do whatever we want (see RPh §15R); it is the 
system of rights that is realised in and guaranteed by the institutions of the state. The 
sovereignty of the free will, therefore, just is the sovereignty of the rational constitutional 
state, the keystone of which is the hereditary monarch. Accordingly, the people in a free, 
rational state cannot choose the head of state, any more than they can choose what counts as a 
rational state.15 Does this mean that elections play no role at all in the free, rational state? No, 
but they play a role only in the legislative power.  
 
5. The Executive and Legislative Powers 
 
In the Encyclopaedia Hegel includes the legislative power in the “particular governmental 
power” (Enc. 3 §543), even though its role is to pass laws dealing with matters of universal 
interest. He does so, I think, because the legislative power is one of the branches of the state 
that, in contrast to the monarch, are concerned with the particular content of “state business”. 
Yet, as is made clear in the Philosophy of Right, the executive branch is in truth the 
                                                          
15 On the sovereignty of the state, see Houlgate 1997, 56-7. 
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“particular governmental power”, since its specific role (in addition to advising the monarch) 
is “the subsumption of particular spheres and individual cases under the universal”, that is, 
under the law (RPh §273). Since its role is that of subsumption, the executive can perhaps be 
regarded as the exercise of understanding by the rational state.  
 The executive is divided into authorities or ministries responsible for different spheres 
of interest (such as education and finance) (RPh §290). It includes the “powers of the 
judiciary and the police” (RPh §287), though the two are clearly distinguished from one 
another, since the former is concerned with legal entitlements, crime and punishment, 
whereas the latter (with broader responsibilities than modern police) ensures that “particular 
welfare should be treated as a right and duly actualized” (RPh §230; see also VPR3, 1442).16 
Ministries are headed by ministers (under a prime minister or chancellor), and otherwise 
comprise civil servants who have more or less direct contact with the people, communities 
and corporations to which laws and government policies are applied. Importantly, Hegel 
points out that those communities and corporations (and their members) have their own rights 
that must be respected by civil servants. Indeed, he notes, such rights are what protect both 
the state and the governed “against the misuse of power on the part of the official bodies and 
their members” — though he acknowledges that civil servants may also need to be controlled 
“from above” and even require the “higher intervention of the sovereign” (RPh §295 & R). 
 Since the members of the executive act only with the sanction of the sovereign, they 
are formally appointed by the latter (RPh §§283, 292). Yet their role requires them to have 
detailed knowledge of both the law and civil society, and so they must prove their 
competence through examinations as a condition of being appointed (VPR2, 1019). Thus, 
ministers and civil servants are chosen on the basis of their “training and aptitude”, not their 
                                                          
16 Hegel also defends the independence of the judiciary by insisting that the government may 
not threaten to suspend the administration of justice (see Enc. 3 §544R).   
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“birth or personal nature”. Furthermore, since “ability” (Befähigung) is “the sole condition” 
of appointment, positions in the executive are in principle open to every qualified citizen 
(Enc. 3 §543, and RPh §291).      
 The third power in the rational state is the legislative power. Note that this is just one 
moment of the political constitution and does not have power over the latter, though it can 
amend it (RPh §298). The distinctive role of the legislative power is to pass laws that concern 
matters of universal interest and will remain in force for many years, rather than to approve 
government measures that can vary every year. Such laws include, for example, “criminal 
laws, laws about contract, about property”, all of which have a “content that is quite 
universal, that is valid in all particular cases” (VPR3, 1449). The legislative power, as Hegel 
conceives it, is thus distinct from both the executive and princely powers.  
Yet it is not utterly separate from them, but contains both as its moments. The 
princely power belongs to the legislative power insofar as it formally approves laws passed 
by the legislative assemblies and, indeed, formally summons those assemblies (as in the 
United Kingdom today) (RPh §§300, 308). The executive power, on the other hand, provides 
advice to its legislative partner, and to that end ministers should themselves be members of 
the assemblies (again as in the United Kingdom, but in contrast to the USA) — though in his 
1817/18 lectures Hegel states that ministers must “have no vote, but just make suggestions 
and expound and explain the reasons for these suggestions” (VPR1, 193; see also VPR2, 
1026, and RPh §300Z). Hegel also notes in the Encyclopaedia that the content of laws passed 
by the assemblies may already have been “prepared” or even “provisionally decided” “by the 
practice of the law-courts”, and the latter — though distinct from the administrative and 
police powers of the government — belong to the executive power, since they subsume 
individual cases under the law (Enc. 3 §544R).   
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A rational political constitution, for Hegel, is thus an organic unity of powers, in 
which each is a moment of the others. It is not a system of “checks and balances” between 
powers based on mutual suspicion. The latter system is what the understanding, rather than 
reason, takes the constitution to be, and can lead to a struggle between the legislature and 
executive, as we sometimes see in the USA and which Hegel associates especially with the 
French Revolution (see Enc. 3 §541R, and VPR3, 1451-2; see also Schnädelbach 1997, 248-
9). Hegel insists that the legislature must hold the “administrative authorities” to account by 
reminding them that “they not only have to exact duties but just as essentially to pay regard to 
rights”, namely the rights of the individuals and civil institutions from which duties are 
demanded (Enc. 3 §544R).17 Indeed, he acknowledges — in 1817/18 and 1824/25 — that 
there should even be an official opposition to the government in the assemblies (VPR1, 205, 
and VPR3, 1453; see Siep 1992, 253). Such opposition, however, should only be to “this 
ministry”, not to government as such. The assemblies should thus not be opposed to the 
executive as a matter of principle, but should be, and take themselves to be, moments of a 
single unified political state.  
The role of the assemblies within the legislative power is to debate and then pass 
legislation. Laws, however, are matters of universal interest and concern everyone, and so 
should be discussed not just by ministers, but also by delegates drawn from civil society as a 
whole (Enc. 3 §544, and RPh §311). Yet the task of the assemblies is not only to ensure that a 
wide range of insights is brought to debates. They also provide a political forum in which 
“private persons” can express their “subjective freedom” and general opinions; they are the 
place in which “the many also get to have their say [mitsprechen]” (Enc. 3 §544, and VPR3, 
1453; see also RPh §§301, 314). In the assemblies, therefore, the “private estate” 
                                                          
17 Siep is thus wrong to claim that, for Hegel, the government is not “obliged to justify itself 
before the assembly of the Estates” (Siep 2017, 210). 
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(Privatstand), with its interests, insights and opinions, “attains a political significance and 
function” (RPh §303). At the same time, when the debates in the assemblies are public, as 
Hegel believes they should be, civil society is itself educated about affairs of state, “enabling 
it to form more rational judgements on the latter” (RPh §315; see Wood 2011, 308).    
 In the Encyclopaedia and Philosophy of Right Hegel contends that citizens in a free, 
rational state must be able to trust that its institutions and laws serve their interests and 
guarantee their freedom (Enc. 3 §515, and RPh §§147, 268; see Houlgate, 2016, 112-15). Yet 
citizens must also feel that they are participating in running the state itself. It falls to the 
assemblies to satisfy this desire in civil society for the “participation of everyone [ ... ] in the 
governmental power” (Enc. 3, §544). In a large state, however, not everyone can participate 
directly in the assemblies, so the members of the latter must be representatives drawn from 
civil society.  
Hegel argues that members of the upper chamber must be selected by nature, since 
they are meant to reflect the interests of those who are dependent on nature and attuned to the 
rhythms of the latter (RPh §203, 305, and VPR2, 966-8) — the interests of what I have 
elsewhere called “ecological intuition” (see Houlgate 1997, 63). These members, by the way, 
are not to be confused with feudal nobility and should not include those who are proud of 
their “lack of merit” (Verdienstlosigkeit). They should work on and care for the land, and so 
can just as easily be called “non-nobility” (Nichtadel) as “nobility” (Adel) (VPR1, 199, and 
VPR3, 1457). The members of the lower chamber, by contrast, are meant to reflect the 
various spheres of human activity and industry in civil society (RPh §308). They can thus be 
selected by means of elections in which, in principle, all may take part. So, although in a 
large state it is not possible for everyone to participate directly in governmental power, it is 
possible for them to participate indirectly through elections.  
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Hegel states, at one point in the Philosophy of Right, that elections are either 
“superfluous” or “an insignificant play of arbitrary opinion” (RPh §311), presumably because 
they do not by themselves ensure that those with the best insights are chosen to enter the 
lower chamber. Yet elsewhere he indicates that elections are, indeed, an important part of a 
rational state (see, e.g., VPR1, 200-1). His understanding of the electoral process, however, 
differs somewhat from what is current today.   
 
6. Elections in the rational state 
  
Hegel’s guiding idea, when considering elections, is that the lower chamber should not just 
represent the sheer will of the people: for were it to do so, “political life”, which is meant to 
protect people’s rights and legitimate interests, would be made dependent on “arbitrary will 
and opinion”, thus on “contingency” (RPh §303R). Equally, membership of the lower 
chamber should not be determined by the simple fact that a large mass of people has certain 
views. Indeed, for Hegel, the “sole aim of the state” with regard to the “people” is to ensure 
that it “should not come to existence, to power and action, as such an aggregate [Aggregat]”. 
Otherwise, what would hold sway would not be reason and right, but the “blind force” of the 
people, the simple weight of numbers (Enc. 3 §544R; see also RPh §302). To put the point 
another way, the “private estate” should not participate in the political process as a shapeless 
mass of individuals, since this would base the laws of the state on the “democratic element 
devoid of rational form” (RPh §308R).18 Hegel was once accused by Karl Popper of 
proclaiming that “might is right” (Popper 1966, 2: 41). Note, however, that he rejects the idea 
that legislation should be determined by the sheer will of the people or the majority, precisely 
                                                          
18 This directly contradicts the influential view of the Abbé Sieyès, for whom “individual 
wills are the sole elements of the general will”. See Sieyès 1951, 50.  
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because it would give pride of place to the might of popular opinion, rather than reason and 
right.  
 Elections to the lower chamber should not, therefore, involve individuals coming 
together “for a moment to perform a single temporary act” and having “no further cohesion” 
(RPh §308). They should be carried out by an “already organized people” (Enc. 3 §544R). As 
indicated above, Hegel accepts that sovereignty resides with the “people”, if one understands 
by the latter the people organised into a rational constitutional state (RPh §279R). Such a 
state as a whole includes the three political powers, but also the institutions of civil society: 
the estates, corporations and other recognized associations. In Hegel’s view, therefore, 
private persons should participate in elections to the lower chamber as members of those civil 
institutions (Enc. 3 §544R, and RPh §308). In this way, they will vote, not as abstract 
individuals with their own (possibly idiosyncratic) views, but as persons who understand the 
rational organisation of civil society and are conscious of the recognized interests and rights 
of the institutions to which they belong.19  
Delegates are in turn sent to the lower chamber not simply by a certain number of 
people, but by organised, recognized institutions — “associations, communities, and 
corporations” (RPh §308). They are, accordingly, “representatives not of individuals as a 
crowd, but of one of the essential spheres of society, i.e. of its major interests” (RPh §311R). 
Indeed, strictly speaking, they are not re-presentatives at all, since they do not stand in for 
someone or something else; rather, the interest of each institution is “actually present in its 
representative” (RPh §311R). The lower chamber is thus the place where not merely the 
opinions of large masses of people, but the recognized rightful interests of associations and 
their members, are given voice. It is, of course, possible that individuals voting en masse as 
                                                          
19 As Klaus Vieweg notes, the right to vote in the rational state is thus connected to the 
“adequate political education of the voters” (Vieweg 2012, 384).  
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individuals may elect delegates who promote their interests and rights, but this is ultimately 
left to chance. If, however, voting occurs within recognized associations, there is a structural 
guarantee that those interests and rights will be given voice in the lower chamber.20           
 For Hegel, then, the entitlement to vote — unlike the right to own and exchange 
property — belongs not to persons as such, but to individuals as members of recognised 
associations or “interest groups” (see Vieweg 2012, 437). Yet this does not mean that Hegel’s 
conception of elections is incompatible with our current conception. In Hegel’s state, for 
example, recognized communities or “municipalities” (Gemeinden) are among the 
associations that send delegates to the lower chamber, and in modern states delegates are 
often elected to represent the constituencies in which voters live. If such constituencies have 
a recognized municipal identity and common interest and are more than mere geographical 
areas, they count as associations in Hegel’s sense (though, as we know, they do not always 
have this character) (RPh §308-9, and VPR2, 1029; see Wood 2011, 308).21  
Modern states, of course, usually have universal adult suffrage, but this too is not 
incompatible with Hegel’s conception of elections. Indeed, Hegel states explicitly in 1817/18 
that “if associations are to send deputies” — to the lower chamber — “and every citizen must 
belong to an association, then every active citizen can also take part in the election” (VPR1, 
                                                          
20 In Hegel’s view, a further guarantee would be provided by requiring delegates to have held 
“positions of authority” in communities or corporations (RPh §310). — Note that, in Hegel’s 
state, laws protecting rights are thus determined by three things: 1) the demands of right itself 
(and the concept of freedom), 2) the insights and opinions of delegates, and 3) the specific 
rights and interests represented by those delegates.  
21 Hegel would presumably oppose proportional representation detached from constituencies. 
Political parties could also count as associations in Hegel’s sense, as long as they represent 
legitimate interests, rather than just numbers of people (see Vieweg 2012, 437, 442). 
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201). He adds that “day laborers, servants, etc., not being members of an association, are 
excluded”; and in the Philosophy of Right he appears to exclude women from voting (RPh 
§301R). In 1824/25, however, he points out that if people are entitled to vote simply by virtue 
of being individuals with free will, “then women also have this right” since “they are 
individuals” (VPR3, 1459). This suggests that, in Hegel’s view, women are excluded from 
voting, not because they allegedly lack free will, but because voting takes place within 
recognized associations and women do not belong to them.22 This in turn suggests that 
women, as well as day labourers and servants, would have the vote, if they were to belong to 
recognized associations, and that universal suffrage is thus not incompatible in principle with 
Hegel’s conception of elections. Indeed, one could argue that these citizens should already be 
entitled to vote in the rational state, since they belong to municipalities and these 
municipalities, by Hegel’s own admission, count as associations (RPh §§308-9). 
As Herbert Schnädelbach notes, Hegel would not regard “mass democracy” as a 
“constitution of freedom” (Schnädelbach 1997, 257). Hegel’s concern, however, is not that 
only the privileged few should be able to vote, but that elections should ensure that the 
recognized rights and interests of civil society are represented in the legislature. In my view, 
there is no reason in principle why every adult citizen should not participate in such elections.    
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Hegel insists that the constitution of a state develops out of the “spirit” of the people 
concerned and cannot simply be transformed at will (Enc. 3 §540R). Each people, therefore, 
has the constitution that is appropriate to it (VPR3, 1425). Yet constitutions are not fixed, but 
                                                          
22 In the Philosophy of Right Hegel maintains that women have their “substantial vocation” in 
the family, rather than in “work and struggle with the external world” (RPh §166). 
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can be amended through legislation or changes in practice (RPh §298). Constitutions can thus  
be subjected to scrutiny and criticism, and Hegel’s idea of the free, rational state provides the 
standard by which to assess modern states that lay claim to being free. From the perspective 
of that idea, various features of modern states fall short of what is required for genuine 
freedom: for example, there is too sharp a division between political powers in some states, 
and in others an underdeveloped system of rights (of both individuals and associations).23 
Most problematic, however, from a Hegelian standpoint, is the modern view that the state 
derives its authority from the “will of the people”, and that the members of the legislature, 
and in some cases the head of state, should be chosen by the people voting as individuals 
(even when they vote in constituencies).  
 This view is problematic for several reasons. First, it produces a legislature that 
reflects the opinions of certain numbers of people, but does not necessarily represent all the 
legitimate, rightful interests of civil society. Second, it leads some states to decide matters of 
national importance through popular referendums, in which people with “no further 
cohesion” come together “for a moment to perform a single temporary act” and in which 
“arbitrary will and opinion” decide the outcome, as much as insight does (RPh, §§303R, 
308). Third, it can expose the position of head of state to the struggle between factions. 
Fourth, and most importantly, it leads modern states to misunderstand what constitutes the 
foundation of their freedom.  
 Modern states often take the foundation of their freedom to be the fact that the people 
choose who will govern them. Freedom is, of course, also taken to involve respect for the rule 
of law, but laws are themselves to be passed by representatives chosen by the people. 
Accordingly, such states describe themselves as “democracies”. For Hegel, however, 
democratic popular choice is in itself merely “formal freedom”, the freedom to decide things 
                                                          
23 See Hegel’s remarks on England’s “backwardness” in this latter regard (Enc. 3 §544R). 
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for oneself on the basis of one’s particular desires and opinions. As such, it is not the 
foundation of freedom but just one moment within genuine “objective freedom”, which 
consists in the system of rights and institutions that constitutes the rational state (Enc. 3 
§544R). This system of rights includes the right to choose one’s property and occupation, as 
well as the freedom to vote, but it is not founded on the freedom of choice. It is determined 
by the concept of freedom, and so is what the free will must affirm if it is to be truly free, and 
it has priority over choice in the rational state. In Hegel’s view, it is this system, not 
democratic choice, that is the true guarantee of freedom in modern states (if and when it is 
present) (see RPh §272R). Freedom thus resides in the clear articulation of rights and in the 
distinct civil institutions and political powers that realise and guarantee these rights.24 Most 
modern states do, indeed, recognize that the division of powers is a crucial pillar of political 
and social freedom. Yet they risk obscuring the importance of that division, and thus of 
leading their citizens to misunderstand the core of true freedom, by describing themselves 
principally as “democracies”.  
 To repeat: Hegel does not deny that elections (through recognised associations) are an 
important component of political freedom, but he insists that popular choice is not itself the 
foundation of our freedom. Indeed, we who come after Hegel know that popular choice in 
modern states can sometimes threaten the rights and institutions which are freedom’s true 
foundation: for parties can be elected to the legislature, as in Germany in 1930 and 1932, that 
have no regard for objective freedom at all but seek to rule through the worst “blind force”.25 
                                                          
24 Note that, although the rational state must have both civil and political institutions, specific 
civil corporations and associations are voluntary organisations (see Avineri 1972, 164-5, and 
RPh §206), whereas the three political powers are necessary. 
25 The National Socialists gained 107 seats in the Reichstag in September 1930 (out of 577) 
and 230 in July 1932 (out of 608). See Bullock 1962, 161, 216-17, 230. 
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Pace Popper, Hegel does not think that “might is right”, but that freedom should govern our 
social and political lives. In his view, however, genuine freedom is guaranteed, not by 
democracy as such, but by a free and rational constitution, the rights it secures and the ethical 
disposition that it produces in its citizens.     
 
